Multiple peril insurance schemes (e.g., revenue and earnings insurance) provide protection against adverse movements in several speci®ed risks. Their indemnity payoff function resembles that of exotic options with complex contingencies. In this paper, it is shown how option pricing techniques can be used to calculate fair premiums for three existing revenue insurance contracts. The products are sold by private insurance companies, but are reinsured by the US government. It is also shown that the reinsurance contract can be valued by the same technique.
INTRODUCTION
Since the seminal work of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) , the arbitrage principle underlying option pricing theory has been extended to a broad range of real and ®nancial instruments. The extant literature has shown that any security whose payo is contractually related to the returns on other traded securities can be valued using arbitrage principles. This is the case for standard ®nancial products such as warrants and convertible bonds, as well as contractual agreements such as insurance contracts.
Starting with Merton's (1977) treatment of deposit insurance, numerous authors have applied the arbitrage pricing principle underlying modern option pricing theory to the valuation of insurance products. In particular, this theory has been applied to pricing various forms of life insurance (Brennan and Schwartz 1976; Walden 1985) , property/liability contracts (Cummins 1988; Shimko 1992) , private mortgage insurance (Kau, Keenan, and Muller 1993) , and catastrophe insurance (Cummins, Lewis, and Phillips 1997; Litzenberger, Beaglehole, and Reynolds 1996) . 1 In this paper, we adopt option pricing techniques to calculate the premiums for three existing agricultural revenue insurance contracts with multiple named perils. Our model assumes competitive, complete, and frictionless markets. We ignore nonobservability, adverse selection, and moral hazard. The contracts considered are particularly interesting because their underlying risks can be hedged using traded futures and options contracts on yield and price (see Li and Vukina 1998) . Turvey (1992) is among the ®rst authors to view a simple crop revenue insurance contract as a standard European put option. More recently, Jung and Ramezani (1999) have shown that the crop revenue coverage (CRC) insurance contract has a path-dependent indemnity with a stochastic deductible. While the present paper has much in common with the foregoing work, it extends it by valuing a broader range of contracts, and the expanded analysis leads to several new insights. The products we consider are based on the same named perils, but dier in their deductible and indemnity payo functions. Each contract oers the policyholder the ability to mitigate speci®c forms of uncertainty. Using a``plain vanilla'' contract as the base case, we show that the added¯exibility oered by more complicated contracts can be valued as embedded options.
Because agricultural risks are highly correlated, insurance companies cannot mitigate their risk exposure by diversifying across policyholders, and hence they are exposed to catastrophic risks. For this reason, private insurance companies have been historically reluctant to underwrite such policies without some form of government support. Therefore, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC), a wholly owned government entity subsidizes the premiums paid by farmers, pays part of the insurer's claims processing expenses, and reinsures them against potential underwriting losses.
In general, insurance policies expose the insured to the risk of policy nonperformance (a form of default risk). Nonperformance risk in¯uences the demand for insurance (Doherty and Schlesinger 1990) , further weakening the market for agricultural insurance. Government grant of reinsurance makes these insurance policies more valuable, as it reduces (or eliminates) the nonperformance risk of the contracts. Thus, the bene®t of shifting this risk to the government accrues to the insurers and policyholders.
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The government granted reinsurance is an implicit subsidy provided to the insurers. We show that the payos to the reinsurance contract can be represented as a portfolio of options on traded assets. Our analysis is the ®rst to provide a direct estimate of the cost of this implicit subsidy based on the risk-neutral valuation principle.
The contents of the paper are organized as follows. In the next section, insurance policies are cast as complex derivatives. In Section 3, we show that the payos to the reinsurance contracts are identical to a portfolio of simple options. In Section 4, we introduce the underlying stochastic processes. In Section 5, we value the insurance and reinsurance contracts using Monte Carlo simulation. In the ®nal sections, we discuss the simulation results and draw our conclusions.
REVENUE INSURANCE CONTRACTS AS COMPLEX DERIVATIVES
We begin with a mathematical representation of the various indemnity payments and show that their structure is similar to path-dependent options on several underlying stochastic processes. The contracts we consider are single-year multirisk insurance contracts. Because of the complexity of the indemnity payment, a closed-form pricing formula cannot be derived in every case. When this occurs, we employ Monte Carlo simulation to numerically calculate the premiums. Our framework is easily extended to other insurance contracts containing multiple sources of risk. Although our analysis would be the same for all existing crop insurance contracts, we consider only contracts on corn because it has the most signi®cant market value. Fix the start of the production year, t, at 15 March. This is the date the insurance contract is purchased. Let T be 1 December of the same year, when the indemnity is paid.
Multiple peril crop insurance (MPCI) is the most common form of coverage and has been the principal means of managing yield risk since the 1930s. This product provides protection against all risks aecting output. Producers receive indemnity payment only if their yield falls below an established minimum guarantee. Although, such outcomes may be accompanied by upward price swings, shortfalls in yield are valued at a preestablished base price, rather than the potentially higher harvest price. Consequently, the contract protects only against shortfalls in output and not revenue (price times output).
The MPCI's minimum guarantee MG is established when the contract is entered at t as MG c "
where 507 T c T 757 (in 5% increments) is the fraction of the actual production history " Y (bushels per acre) that the producer chooses to insure. The base price p t is a regional price average, which is calculated at date t and remains unchanged throughout the life of the policy.
At the contract settlement date T , the calculated revenue R MPCI is
where Y T is the realized output. If R MPCI is below MG, the contract pays an indemnity I MPCI :
The indemnity payment is identical to a European put option with MG acting as the strike price and R MPCI as the underlying asset. To value MPCI, a stochastic process for output Y T must be speci®ed. Any proposed process would have zero drift, because the growth rate of yield over one planting period is zero. Under a lognormal output process, the Black and Scholes (1973) formula would be appropriate provided that a traded asset highly correlated with yield exists (i.e., CBOT futures contracts on yield; see Li and Vukina 1998) . MPCI serves as our base case insurance contract. The other contracts we consider improve on MPCI by oering additional¯exibility, which we value as embedded options. Under the current actuarial method of insurance rate-making, the premiums for MPCI are set equal to a multiple of the average historical ratio of indemnity payouts to insured value (typically, 27 years of data). This pricing method is based exclusively on the ®rst moment of the yield distribution and ignores all higher-order moments. Moreover, futures prices are not used to set the base price; hence, the method of setting premiums is not forward looking. Josephson, Lord, and Mitchell (2000) provide further details of the actual MPCI ratemaking process. A ®nal criticism (Borch 1985) of actuarial methods of ratemaking is that these methods ignore the market price of risks. For example, a variety of ad hoc discount rates are used (Garven 1987) . Our approach addresses this concern.
Income protection (IP) expands on MPCI by guaranteeing revenue, rather than yield alone. The guarantee is the product of the prevailing futures market price at the time of planting (for delivery at harvest) multiplied by the base yield. Indemnity payments are made only if revenues at harvest fall below the minimum guarantee.
The minimum guarantee for IP is identical to that of MPCI (equation (1)), but the base price p t is calculated as the product of the average " F t of February daily settlement futures price (December delivery) times the farmer's chosen price coverage ( 957 or 1007): p t " F t . The calculated revenue R IP is
where the output price p T is the product of the average " F T of the November daily settlement price (December delivery) times the price coverage: p T " F T . If the calculated revenue falls below the minimum guarantee, an indemnity is paid:
The indemnity payment is a European put option that depends on two named perils. Because p T is the arithmetic average of futures prices, the indemnity is path dependent and a closed-form valuation formula is not available. Note that under IP the farmer may have a low yield, but still be ineligible for an indemnity payment if the harvest price is suciently high. Moreover, with IP, the farmer is exposed to the correlated risks of both output and price. We integrate this correlation into our pricing methodology. The actuarial method of insurance rate-making for IP uses linear regression to model the level of price and yield for each locality. Given the model parameters and the current levels of the price and yield, an empirical revenue distribution is constructed by randomly sampling from the residuals of the ®tted regression models (10 000 draws). For each run of the simulation, the indemnity is calculated as the shortfall in projected revenue relative to the guaranteed revenue. Premiums are set equal to the average of the simulated indemnities plus an arbitrary 207 loading factor to``accommodate future price¯uctua-tions'' (General Accounting Oce 1998, p. 71). While this procedure accounts for the historical relation between prices and yield, it ignores other important factors. For example, simulated indemnities, which are paid after the harvest season, are not discounted to the time of planting when premiums are set.
Crop revenue coverage (CRC) takes IP one step further by adding replacement coverage to the guarantee, should the price at harvest exceed the price at planting. Consequently, CRC provides upward price protection, where the guaranteed¯oor is the maximum of two separate guarantees: the minimum guarantee MG and the harvest guarantee HG.
While MG is set on the planting date t (equation (1)), HG is not determined until T :
where " Y and p T are as in IP, but CRC places limits on the output price:
where L $1X50 for corn. Note that while CRC improves on the guaranteed¯oor provided by IP, it forces the policyholder to forfeit price increases beyond L. This tradeo is explicitly priced in our framework.
The maximum of MG and HG is de®ned as the ®nal guarantee FG. Jung and Ramezani (1999) have shown that FG is equivalent to c " Y shares of a Europeaǹ`c ollar option'', written on p T , with¯oor p t and ceiling p t L:
where CxY k max f0Y x À kg is the terminal date payo to a European call option written on an underlying process x with strike price k. The call is a pathdependent Asian option, whose underlying is the arithmetic average of November futures prices for delivery in December. The calculated revenue R CRC is as in equation (4), but p T is subject to the price limit L:
Hence, R CRC is equivalent to a random number Y T of shares of a Europeaǹ`c ollar option'', written on p T , with¯oor p t À L and ceiling p t L. If R CRC falls below FG, the contract makes an indemnity payment:
The indemnity is identical to that of an option whose terminal payo is the dierence between two European collar options. Note that the strike price is also stochastic. For these contracts, the averaging of futures prices``smoothes'' large dailȳ uctuations and removes the likelihood of price manipulation. For similar reasons, the historical yield "
Y is averaged over a 4±10 year period. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) have shown that in a competitive market a separating equilibrium can be achieved by oering a menu of contracts that allows the insured to sort into dierent risk classes. For the contracts we consider, the parameters c and determine the eective deductibles, allowing the insured farmers to signal their type. While the deductibles address adverse selection, insurance companies must monitor production activity and assess output quality to minimize moral hazard. The actuarial method of insurance rate-making for CRC assumes that the yield and harvest price are independently normally distributed. Historical data are used to estimate the parameters of these distributions. CRC premiums are the sum of three components. The ®rst is the``yield risk'' component, which accounts for the probability that actual yield is lower than the insured yield, conditional on the harvest price being less than the base price. The second is thè`u pward price risk'' component, which accounts for the probability that harvest price is higher than the base price, while actual yield is lower than the insured yield. The third is the``revenue risk'' component, which accounts for the probability that actual revenues are below the guaranteed revenue, while both price and yield are below their base level (General Accounting Oce 1998).
The CRC premiums are therefore a function of the conditional probabilities obtained from the assumed yield and price distributions. However, because the two distributions are assumed to be independent, the correlation between yields and prices is ignored (General Accounting Oce 1998, p. 58). Moreover, unlike the IP procedure, CRC uses the harvest price instead of futures price, which implies that the resulting premiums are not forward looking.
REINSURANCE AS A PORTFOLIO OF OPTIONS
Insurance companies that underwrite the above contracts reinsure their exposure through the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC). Unlike the traditional`e xcess of loss'' reinsurance, where losses above a prespeci®ed threshold are fully insured (subject to a possible cap), the FCIC reinsurance contract requires the companies to retain responsibility for a portion of their risk exposure, thereby minimizing the potential for adverse selection.
3 For the retained portion, underwriting losses and gains are shared between the company and FCIC, based on a complicated payment schedule. The FCIC also reimburses the company for a portion of its administrative and operating expenses.
The reinsurance contract is a single-period contract that expires on date T . For each contract underwritten, the insurance company collects a premium V at t, but the contract exposes the company to the risk of paying an indemnity I at T .
De®ne the loss ratio as LR IaNBP, where NBP V 1 À AO is the net book premiums, with AO (a percentage) the administrative and operating expense subsidy. Under reinsurance, FCIC claims a portion of the company's underwriting gains and reimburses a portion of its underwriting losses. When LR`1, the portion of the gain that is recovered by FCIC is GLR. Similarly, when LR b 1, the portion of the loss that is reimbursed by FCIC is LLR. Figure 1 plots the net gains GLR and losses LLR per dollar of net book premium NBP for a single contract. As the plot shows, the sharing rule between FCIC and the insurance company is asymmetric and highly nonlinear, where large losses (gains) are subject to higher reimbursement (recovery). The Appendix shows that the sharing rule consists of several layers of excess of loss reinsurance, with each layer marked by a dierent loss ratio that is equivalent to a standard European spread option.
Because of their payo complexity, no analytical solution exists, and we proceed numerically. Speci®cally, when the loss ratio LR is less than 1.0, the net gain is a put spread:
where Pk is a European put option (i.e., max f0Y k À LRg). Equation (10) is simply the payo to a portfolio of put options, where the LR 's are the FCIC mandated exposures (or, equivalently, the number of shares) to each put, with 0X65 67, 0X50 307, and 0X00 897. Therefore, the FCIC's claim on the insurance company increases at an accelerating rate as LR decreases. Similarly, when LR b 1, the net loss is a call spread:
where Ck is a European call option and the 's are the exposures to each call, with 1X00 437, 1X60 577, 2X20 837, and 5X00 1007. All losses above LR 5X00 are fully reimbursed. To summarize, the insurance company holds a portfolio consisting of singleperiod insurance and reinsurance contracts. At the settlement date T , the company pays out indemnity I k and receives (pays) reinsurance payment. Hence, the net payment to this portfolio, denoted by NP k , is
where the subscript k denotes dierent contracts: k MPCI, IP, or CRC. The equation demonstrates how the FCIC-sponsored reinsurance contract reduces a company's risk exposure by capping the maximum loss, as without reinsurance, the net payout is simply ÀI k . Speci®cally, as indemnities I k increase, the ®rm begins to experience losses as its LR climbs above 1.0, implying L k LR b 0 and G k LR 0. Note that the present value of NP k IY LR is the premium that would be charged in an ecient, competitive, frictionless, and complete market.
SPECIFICATION OF THE UNDERLYING RISK PROCESSES
As noted earlier, commodity markets oer futures and option contracts that enable the insurers to hedge their exposure to yield and price risks. In principle, futures price risk can be perfectly hedged using existing instruments. This is not the case with insured yield, as the marketed yield instruments (futures and option) are based on aggregate yield at the state or national level, rather than a speci®c farm's yield. As a consequence, the insurer is exposed to yield basis risk.
To assess the impact of basis risk on premiums, we calculate the premiums and reinsurance costs for a representative farm with yield distribution identical to the aggregate yield at the national level.
The contracts under consideration have three underlying state variables, representing the evolution of corn futures price F, aggregate yield Y, and the individual farm's yield Y i . We assume these state variables follow a trivariate correlated geometric Brownian motion 4 We have ignored the possibility of jumps and mean reversion in both the futures price and yield processes.
VALUING THE INSURANCE AND REINSURANCE CONTRACTS BY MONTE CARLO SIMULATION
In a risk-neutral environment, the value of the insurance and reinsurance contracts is the discounted value of their expected terminal date cash¯ow. The expectation is under the risk-neutral measure, and discounting occurs at the riskfree rate r. Monte Carlo simulation approximates the expectation with the arithmetic average of the terminal payos taken over a ®nite number n 1Y F F F Y N of simulated price paths (see Boyle 1977) . The calculated value of the insurance premium is
where Ip T Y Y T is given by equation (3), (5), or (9). Similarly, the calculated value of reinsurance Re is
where GLR and LLR are given by equations (10) and (11).
Following standard practice, we use Cholesky decomposition to transform the correlated processes in (13) into uncorrelated Brownian motions. Following Black (1976) and Marcus and Modest (1984) , we assume the risk-neutral futures price process is a martingale with no drift (" F 0). The production setting is taken to be point input/point output, where the crop is planted at t and harvested approximately 10 months later at T . Hence, the instantaneous growth rate of yield, though positive over many years, is zero 4 There exists an extensive literature assessing the empirical distribution of crop yields. Just and Weninger (1999) provide a survey of this literature and show that the assumption of normality of yields cannot be rejected. Using nonparametric estimation procedures, Goodwin and Ker (1998) show that crop insurance premiums are not sensitive to the choice of yield distributions. This lack of consensus, particularly because yields cannot assume negative values, leads us to our distributional assumption. 5 For alternative speci®cations of the futures price process, see Schwartz (1997) . within any crop year (" Y i " Y 0). Once planting has occurred, the actual output Y T is the realization from a ®xed distribution, ruling out any supply response to short-run changes in market conditions.
For simpli®cation, we also assume that ' Y i ' Y . This is a reasonable assumption for regions with homogeneous agronomic conditions (like the corn-belt), where yields¯ow from the same exogenous factors. Lastly, we assume both the aggregate and individual farm yields (bushels per acre) are uncorrelated with the overall economy during a given planting cycle. Hence, their market price of risk is zero. Alternatively, Merton (1998) shows that a tracking portfolio, with error that is orthogonal to the overall market, can be constructed from a portfolio consisting of all traded assets. Further, two tracking instruments for corn yield, yield insurance futures and futures options, are traded on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT).
For a given set of parameters, we generate 20 000 simulations for futures price and yield at T . These values are then used in equations (14) and (15) to calculate premiums V and reinsurance value Re.
RESULTS
The results of our analysis are shown in Tables 1±3. We present our ®ndings for dierent sets of parameters and across dierent insurance contracts. The ®rst part highlights the sensitivity of premiums to a change in parameters, while the second compares the various contracts to demonstrate the value of the embedded options.
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The contract's premium V and reinsurance value Re are both linearly increasing in yield and price coverage levels c and . To obtain an upper bound for both V and Re, we set c and to their maximum allowable values of 0.75 and 1.00. For the 1997 crop year, FCIC data indicates that aggregate corn yield " Y was 126 bushels per acre and base price p t was $2.60 per bushel. For each run of the simulation, we set the initial futures price equal to the base price (p t F tYT ), so that the contract is``at-the-money'' with respect to price. The 1997 Treasury bill rate is used for the risk-free rate (r 5X477). The entries in each cell are the calculated premiums V and reinsurance value Re. Each row shows the impact of changes in yield volatility ' Y on V and Re. A total of 20 000 simulations are performed with yield coverage c 757, price coverage 1007, base price p t $2X60, futures price F t $2X60, futures price volatility ' F 0X25, correlation between yield and futures price & Fy À0X5, historical yield " Y 126 bushels/acre, and r 5X477. The entries in each cell are the calculated premiums V and reinsurance value Re. Each column shows the impact of changes in the correlation between futures price and yield on V and Re. A total of 20 000 simulations are performed with yield coverage c 757, price coverage 1007, yield volatility ' Y 0X04, base price p t $2X60, futures price F t $2X60, historical yield " Y 126 bushels/acre, and r 5X477. Table 1 shows the impact of changes in yield volatility ' Y on premiums V and the reinsurance value Re for dierent degrees of moneyness. The relation is almost linear (rising with ' Y ) and becomes U-shaped as the contract goes out-ofthe-money. This is a consequence of the complex payo structure of these contracts.
8 Table 2 shows that V and Re signi®cantly change with the degree of moneyness. Each column shows that V and Re increase with the futures price volatility ' F . Similarly, each row shows the impact of the yield±price correlation & FY . When the contract is in-the-money, V decreases and Re increases as ' FY increases; otherwise they move together. Our results quantify the conjecture put forward in the General Accounting Oce (1998, p. 58) report: ignoring ' FY signi®cantly biases V and Re. Again, similar results are obtained at the individual farm level.
In practice, FCIC sets the CRC premium uniformly above the IP premium (General Accounting Oce 1998). Our results indicate the gap in premiums should be related to the degree of moneyness. For example, when ' F is low, and the insured yield is expected to exceed the historical average (the contracts is outof-the-money), the CRC premium is higher than the IP premium (and the corresponding Re values). The opposite occurs when the contract is in-themoney and ' F is high.
We compare our calculated premiums with actual premiums for 1997. The base price (p t 2X60) is the only parameter common to the two sets of data. Because the historical yield " Y, yield coverage c, and price coverage associated with the actual premiums are unknown, the premium values cannot be directly compared. However, by normalizing the premiums relative to the maximum insured liability, we can provide a rough comparison.
The distributional characteristics of the ratio of premiums to maximum insured liability (by state) are reported in Table 3 . Overall, the mean ratio for our analysis is similar to the mean ratio for the actual premiums. This is due primarily to our comparisons with the aggregated state premiums. However, because our pricing approach is fundamentally dierent from the models used by FCIC, the higher-order moments diverge signi®cantly.
Several factors can explain the dierences found in Table 3 . First, our model parametrization is signi®cantly dierent from the one used by the FCIC. Second, these insurance contracts oer a number of additional¯exibilities. Farmers are allowed to replant their insured acreage, collect part of their indemnity before harvest guarantee is known, separate their farm into irrigated or nonirrigated practices with dierent premium rates, and spread their premium payment over a number of months. These provisions provide valuable options that are not priced in our models. Similarly, premiums may re¯ect agency costs that are absent from our model. 
CONCLUSIONS
This paper values CRC, IP, and MPCI revenue insurance products along with their associated reinsurance contracts as portfolios of exotic and standard options. We utilize Monte Carlo simulation to calculate the premiums for these products under a wide range of parameters. Our model accounts for important factors that have been overlooked in the current rate-making practice, particularly the correlation structure of the state variables. Our analysis shows that the value of the reinsurance contract is a signi®cant fraction of the calculated premiums. Although strong assumptions underlie our model (complete, competitive, and frictionless markets), our analysis provides an estimate of premiums in a competitive equilibrium setting. Our analysis is useful because it provides a benchmark by which the ecacy of other pricing schemes can be measured.
APPENDIX

Reinsurance contract as a portfolio of options
This appendix shows that the reinsurance contract can be represented as a portfolio of standard European options. For each contract, the insurance company collects a premium V at t, but the contract exposes the company to the risk of paying an indemnity I at T . Under reinsurance, the``underwriting loss'' is de®ned as the amount by which the indemnity exceeds the``net book premium'', I À NBP b 0, where NBP V 1 À AO, with AO (a percentage) the expense subsidy paid by the FCIC. Conversely,``underwriting gain'' is NBP À I b 0. De®ne the loss ratio as LR IaNBP. The``net underwriting gain'' GLR is the portion of the gain that is recovered by the FCIC when the loss ratio is low (LR`1). Similarly, the``net underwriting loss'' LLR is the portion of the loss that is reimbursed by the FCIC when LR b 1. The payment schedule on the company's net underwriting gain GLR is cumulative and increases as the loss ratio LR decreases. Speci®cally, if 0X65 T LR`1X00, the company pays 0X65 67 of its underwriting gain NBP À I to the FCIC: 10 G 0X65 LR 0X65 NBP À I 0X65 NBP1X00 À LRX AX1
In addition to the payment in equation (A.1), the company must pay 0X50 307 of all underwriting gains earned over the range 0X50 T LR`0X65. This payment is 0X50 0X65NBP À I, which when combined with equation (A.1) 10 We assume that a single revenue insurance contract is reinsured, and it is allocated to the FCICdesignated Commercial Fund because the bulk of 1997 premiums were allocated to this fund (Glauber 1999 Finally, in addition to the payment in equation (A.2), the company must forfeit 0X00 0X50NBP À I for all underwriting gains earned over the range 0X00 T LR`0X50. The overall cumulative payment is therefore G 0X00 LR 0X65 NBP À 0X65NBP 0X50 0X65NBP À 0X50NBP 0X00 0X50NBP À I NBP0X35 0X65 0X15 0X50 0X00 0X50 À LRY AX3
where 0X00 897. Thus, net underwriting gains consist of several layers of traditional excess of loss reinsurance, with each layer marked by a dierent loss ratio. A similar``layered'' payment schedule applies to the net underwriting loss LLR, which is cumulative and increasing in LR. If 1X00`LR T 1X60, the company is reimbursed L 1X00 LR NBP 1X00 LR À 1Y AX4
where 1X00 437. If 1X60`LR T 2X20, the cumulative reimbursement is
where 1X60 577. If 2X20`LR T 5X00, the cumulative reimbursement is L 2X20 LR NBP0X60 1X00 1X60 2X20 LR À 2X20Y AX6 where 2X20 837. Finally, if 5X00`LR, the cumulative reimbursement is L 5X00 LR NBP0X60 1X00 1X60 2X80 2X20 5X00 LR À 5X00Y AX7
where 5X00 1007. Thus, all losses above LR 5X00 are fully reimbursed.
